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QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES IN COALITION FOREIGN POLICY: 
SCOPE, CONTENT, PROCESS 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
  
From Britain to Israel, coalitions have been observed more frequently as the form of executive 
power across a broad range of parliamentary systems. Consequently, they have become the loci 
of foreign policy decisions. As this symposium demonstrates, the literature on coalition foreign 
policy has theorized that coalition parties shape foreign policy debates by way of their 
ideological positions as well as their relative size in the parliament and in the government. The 
quantitative study of coalition foreign policy offers to refine and test these expectations on the 
content of policy and its behavioral characteristics. Do coalitions constrain international 
commitments or do they enable extreme behavior at the international level? Are some coalitions 
more constraining or enabling than others, and which mechanisms explain those relationships? 
Does the ideological cohesion of coalition parties alleviate constraints? How does the relative 
ideological positioning of coalition parties influence foreign policy choices? This symposium 
contribution presents an overview of the quantitative literature on coalition foreign policy that 
has grown at a remarkable speed over the last decade to respond to these puzzles among others. 
 These studies have not only dissected coalition governments to highlight the effects of 
their arithmetic and ideological setup on foreign policy behaviour, but situated the empirical 
analyses within frameworks ranging from coalition theories in Comparative Politics to theories 
of group psychology. In so doing, they have been successful in realising Foreign Policy Analysis 
“as a bridging field linking international relations theory, comparative politics and the foreign 
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policymaking community” (Hudson and Vore, 1995: 228). These studies have also moved away 
from the context of conflict behaviour in International Relations, which provides only a subset of 
all international interactions, towards a more inclusive scope. Indeed, empirical tools such as 
events data have allowed for the comprehensive analysis of the cooperative as well as the 
conflictual behaviour of coalition governments, and may open further avenues in examining the 
wide variety of state behaviours in the international system.  
 The remaining sections of this article survey the emergence and development of this 
literature, its debates, contributions, limitations, and possible avenues for further research. We 
begin by presenting the motivations behind the coalition foreign policy research agenda and its 
contributions by situating it vis-à-vis the previous generation of scholarship that focused on the 
effects of domestic politics on the international conflict behaviour of democracies. The third 
section discusses the explanandum (Hudson, 2014) in coalition foreign policy. What is the nature 
of coalition foreign policy behaviour: is it more cooperative, conflictual, or generally more 
extreme or committed? Furthermore, what other types of measures can we develop? In the fourth 
section, we unpack the substantive contributions of the coalition foreign policy literature by 
introducing its ‘content’- and ‘process’-based approaches, specifically with regards to the role 
that the ideological composition and size of coalitions play in explaining behaviour. In the final 
section, we discuss the role of context and the promise of multi-method approaches for future 
research on coalition foreign policy. We conclude that complementing aggregate-level analyses 
with nuanced and more targeted case study designs will help us move closer to a real research 
program that links Foreign Policy Analysis with International Relations. Further, studying the 
quality of foreign policy-making will bring our research closer to the Comparative Politics 
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literature on coalitions, thus providing the field a more complete picture of how this government 
type works. 
 
BRINGING ‘FOREIGN POLICY’ BACK IN: EXPLICATING THE LINK BETWEEN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR  
Although the theoretical significance of coalitions on foreign policy-making has been discussed 
for quite some time (Hagan, 1993; Hagan, Everts, Fukui and Stempel, 2001), the quantitative 
literature on the subject has emerged first as a response to what we call ‘the first generation’ 
studies on domestic politics and international conflict.  
 The prominence of the ‘Democratic Peace’ literature by the late-1990s paved the way for 
the first generation studies: if “the use of force by democracies in large part results from the 
domestic circumstances confronting their chief executives” (Auerswald, 1999: 469), how could 
we explicate the domestic institutions that have led to those circumstances? Could we 
operationalise the domestic political institutions of democracies and test their influence on their 
international behaviour? In a number of influential contributions Prins and Sprecher (1999), 
Ireland and Gartner (2001), Reiter and Tillman (2002), Leeds and Davis (1997, 1999), Leblang 
and Chan (2003) and Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) have answered these puzzles with 
sophisticated quantitative analyses.  
  These studies have scrutinised democratic institutions to determine whether the 
continuous or categorical variation in the number of parties in a government or its majority or 
minority status in the parliament influenced the likelihood of conflict initiation or escalation. 
Exceptions such as Palmer et al. (2004) have also tested the effect of the pivotal parties in a 
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government as well as its overall ideological orientation on the probability of conflict 
involvement and escalation.  
 The more recent quantitative literature on coalition foreign policy has challenged these 
studies on two fronts. First, there is a difference in the framing of research puzzles. The central 
motivation of the first generation studies was to solve the key puzzle in International Relations—
‘what causes war?’— by utilising the institutional explanations of the Democratic Peace 
framework. In other words, these studies were not so much interested in understanding the 
theoretical reasons why certain domestic political factors in a democracy constrain its 
international behaviour as they were in which of those factors, if any, had any effect on the 
conflict propensity of this regime type. Categorical variables such as coalition or majority status 
of the government, or continuous variables such as the number of parties in government or the 
seat share of the government in the parliament were included in the models to scrutinise the 
democratic regimes to illustrate the explanatory power of the Democratic Peace theory rather 
than identifying the institutional constraints that they exert on a government’s international 
interactions more broadly. Having remained by and large under the shadow of the second-image 
school in IR, the first generation studies have also resulted in inconclusive findings. While some 
of them observe that coalitions lead to a decrease in the likelihood of conflict involvement 
(Palmer et al., 2004), others find no relationship between the number of parties in a democratic 
government and its international conflict behaviour (Leblang and Chan, 2003; Reiter and 
Tillman, 2002).  
 Coalition foreign policy scholars have taken this set of findings as a starting point for 
attempting to theorise why we might see variation between the international behaviour of 
coalitions and single-party governments. What is it about the nature of a coalition government 
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that differentiates its international behaviour from a single-party government? Do coalitions act 
more constrained than single-party governments because the former includes several veto players 
(Hagan, 1993; Tsebelis, 1999), or are they less constrained since the coalition partners can blame 
each other for policy failures and diffuse responsibility (Fisher and Hobolt, 2010)? Similarly, 
what explains the variation in the behaviour of majority and minority coalitions in parliamentary 
democracies? Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) are the first to ask these questions from the perspective 
of Foreign Policy Analysis, with an interest in the domestic institutional dynamics of foreign 
policy-making in parliamentary systems, situating their work outside the Democratic Peace 
debate. Their study found that coalitions, compared to single-party governments, were neither 
more aggressive nor more cooperative, but were instead more extreme in their foreign policy 
behaviours. More recent research (Clare, 2010; Beasley and Kaarbo, 2014; Oktay, 2014; Oktay-
Karagul, 2014) have scrutinised coalitions even further to capture the structural variation among 
them. As we discuss below, these studies problematised the categorical understanding of 
coalitions and argued that the way they are set up arithmetically and ideologically should 
influence their international behaviour.  
 The second, equally important, point of divergence between the first generation studies 
and the coalition foreign policy literature is the scope of international behaviour that is utilised 
for empirical analysis. As mention above, the earlier studies have focused exclusively on 
international conflict: what are the domestic political causes of conflict involvement and 
escalation? While their interest in conflict is not surprising given the core theoretical 
motivations, it is severely limited relative to the wide range of behaviours of interest to foreign 
policy scholars. Indeed, international conflict captures a small fraction of all state interactions. 
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the institutional configurations of governments may 
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be altered or may matter in different ways when they are dealing with militarised conflicts, as the 
locus of decision-making may become restricted, international factors may become more 
influential, or the processes of deliberation and negotiation may be affected by the short time 
often associated with crises (Hermann, 1963; Hermann, 2001).  
 Using conflict data to explain the effects of government structure in parliamentary 
systems thus not only limits the universe of behaviours, but may also under-represent the impact 
of institutional structures on other types of foreign policy behaviours. Coalition foreign policy 
scholars have therefore moved away from the more traditional datasets such as the Military 
Interstate Disputes (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004) to international events datasets such as the 
WEIS (McClelland, 1978; see Kaarbo and Beasley, 2008; Beasley and Kaarbo, 2014) and the 10 
Million International Dyadic Events Dataset (10MIDE) (King and Lowe, 2004; see Oktay, 2014) 
to capture the broad range of activities that parliamentary governments engage in abroad. This 
has resulted in a more comprehensive understanding of states’ international behaviour and truly 
moved us to the broader scope of Foreign Policy Analysis.   
 
COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, EXTREME OR COMMITTED? THE NATURE OF 
FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR IN COALITIONS:  
The breadth of behaviours in the events datasets has allowed coalition foreign policy scholars to 
develop a variety of dependent variables. Indeed, these datasets (e.g. WEIS; 10MIDE) provide a 
wide range of categories into which states’ behaviours are classified.  In an effort to quantify 
these for use in statistical analysis, coalitions studies have relied on the use of Goldstein’s (1992) 
20-point scale which arrays behaviours along a single continuum ranging from most conflictual 
(-10) to most cooperative (+10).  Starting from this measure of cooperation/conflict, Beasley and 
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Kaarbo (2014; Kaarbo and Beasley, 2008) fold the scale at 0 in order to produce a measure of 
‘extremity’, where the event behaviours towards either end of the continuum involve more 
extreme behaviours (eg. expel, reward) while those closer to 0 involve less extreme behaviours 
(eg. comment, denial).  Beasley and Kaarbo also develop a separate binary measure (moderately 
positively correlated with ‘extremity’) of ‘commitment’ by coding each event as either verbal or 
non-verbal.    
 These measures of the dependent variable have also generated debate regarding the 
nature of the explanandum. Oktay-Karagul (2014) argues that the dimensions of behaviour—
cooperative, conflictual, and extreme—assume different meanings relative to the target of the 
behaviour as well as to the political context within which it takes place. For instance, a 
government’s ‘political support for war’ could be understood on the one hand as ‘cooperative’ 
behaviour if its target is an ally and it takes place within the context of a war coalition towards a 
common adversary. On the other hand, the adversary would interpret this behaviour as a form of 
aggression towards itself, which illustrates the relational nature of ‘cooperation.’ ‘Extremity’ is 
similarly context-bound. The 2000 visit of the Belgian Prime Minister to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC)—the first official visit to the former colony in a decade—could be 
framed as ‘extreme’ within the context of the relations between these states (Kelly, 2007: 75). 
Once it is decontextualised, however, the behaviour remains a modest expression of the intention 
that the coalition government in Belgium had to improve the relations with the DRC.   
 Oktay (2014), while using the same folded scale, has thus offered to re-conceptualise the 
dependent variable as commitment intensity, which measures the level of “the resources used and 
the expectations generated by the behavior” (Callahan, 1982: 183), regardless of its policy 
direction—cooperative or conflictual. The multilevel regression tests that use this variable 
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conclude that coalitions lead to a decrease in commitment intensity compared to single-party 
governments (Oktay, 2014: 872). Put differently, coalitions engage in foreign policy behaviours 
that utilise fewer resources than single-party governments. Coalitions are also more cautious to 
verbally bind themselves to future policy positions when compared to their single-party 
counterparts.  
 These dependent variables have effectively moved analyses away from conflict data and 
towards a more nuanced and diverse set of behaviours along dimensions of interest to foreign 
policy scholars.  While the Goldstein scale itself, however, remains rooted in more traditional 
‘conflict-cooperation’ thinking, we have been able to conceptualise this scale in ways more 
sensible from the vantage point of Foreign Policy Analysis.  Still there is room to explore 
additional measures that so far have not been examined in the extant quantitative work.  An 
alternative measure, for example, could be to examine the degree of foreign policy variation and 
change we see from coalition governments compared to other types of governments. Are 
coalitions (or different types of coalitions) prone to a high degree of foreign policy change within 
governments? This would potentially capture an important expectation from coalitions that they 
are prone to political compromise and may by necessity engage in issue linkages and political 
logrolling.  Drawing upon measure of variance rather than measures of means makes sense from 
a theoretical point of view, then, and is certainly possible with existing data. 
 As the preceding discussion shows, the use of events data has facilitated the development 
of several alternatives to conflict initiation or escalation as the key dependent variables. 
However, we reckon that the advantages of events data have not been fully exploited in the 
quantitative studies to date. That is, we have included non-conflict/war behaviours in our 
analyses in addition to conflict/war behaviours, but we have not disaggregated these from the 
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conflict/war events and attempted to analyse them separately. Moving even further away from 
the logic of the ‘conflict-cooperation’ scale, we might also attempt to explore variations across 
different non-conflict/war event behaviours (such as, say, promising vs. denying), or to unpack  
the coalition dynamics associated with more specific types of non-conflict/war behaviours, such 
as signing an agreement or condemning others’ behaviours. Explicating these variations in 
behaviour should advance our understanding of the nature of coalition foreign policy. 
 	
CONTENT AND PROCESS: APPROACHES FOR EXPLAINING COALITION 
FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR 
As it moves the scope of analysis beyond the ‘first generation studies’ the quantitative literature 
on coalition foreign policy has made two major strides in studying the relationship between 
coalition politics and international behaviour. We categorise these contributions with respect to 
their focus on the content of government structure, and the processes through which these 
governments generate foreign policy behaviours.  
 
CONTENT: THE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGY AND COALITION TYPE ON FOREIGN 
POLICY BEHAVIOUR  
Whereas earlier studies (Kaarbo and Beasley, 2008) responded to the first generation of IR 
scholarship on domestic politics and international conflict as explained earlier, the more recent 
studies came as a reaction to their work by zooming in on the nuances among coalition 
governments to explain the variation in foreign policy behaviour. These nuances emanate from 
the two defining characteristics of all coalitions: their ideological composition and their type.  
 “Partisan sources of preference” (Kelly, 2007: 75) on the foreign policy choices of 
democratic governments have been iterated numerous times in the existing literature (Hagan et 
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al., 2001; Rathbun, 2004). Kaarbo (2012: 7) has argued that “political ideology and partisanship 
are important and overlooked sources of policy disagreement,” specifically referring to the 
coalitional environment. Some of the key qualitative contributions on coalition foreign policy 
(Kaarbo, 1996a, 1996b) have illustrated the effect of ideology on foreign policy choice by 
focusing on the role of the ‘critical’ or ‘pivotal’ junior partner in the coalition. These studies 
have shown that the disproportionate mathematical advantage of a critical junior partner—
without which the government cannot maintain the majority in the parliament—can allow it to 
‘hijack’ the coalition (Kaarbo, 1996b: 502). The resultant decision of the government reflects 
where this party is ideologically located relative to that of the government.  
 The first quantitative study to systematically incorporate the effect of ideology on 
coalition foreign policy behaviour belongs to Clare (2010), who has tested Kaarbo’s (1996a, 
1996b) ‘hijacking’ argument and concluded that in the absence of ideologically outlier parties, 
coalitions “act similar to single-party governments in their [conflict] initiatory propensity” 
(Clare, 2010: 985). Subsequently Oktay (2014) analysed the effects of the overall ideological 
cohesion of coalitions on their foreign policy commitments. She has found that ideologically 
loose coalitions engage in less intense international commitments, regardless of the presence of a 
pivotal junior party, suggesting that it is difficult to commit political will and material resources 
when coalition parties do not share ideological similarities. These studies have moved us beyond 
the single-party vs. coalition dichotomy towards a more nuanced understanding of the content of 
government structure. 
 Another key content variable that goes alongside ideological cohesion in coalition foreign 
policy concerns the arithmetic composition of the government. Coalitions come in various forms: 
they can be majority or minority governments based on their parliamentary seat share; they can 
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include two or several parties, where one or neither junior partner is pivotal. We expect that each 
of these configurations exert different levels of constraints on the government, which should 
influence its foreign policy behaviour. In an effort to isolate these effects, the coalition foreign 
policy literature has taken various strategies. Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) utilise a combination of 
the parliamentary seat share and the number of parties in a government. They find that fewer 
parliamentary seats (as a percentage) is associated with more extreme and conflictual behaviours 
for coalitions but less extreme and conflictual behaviours for single parties, and that more 
coalition parties is associated with more conflictual behaviours and is non-linearly related to 
extremity of behaviours. On the other hand, Oktay (2014) uses categorical measures from the 
Comparative Politics literature, namely minority, minimum winning and surplus majority 
coalitions and concludes that only minority coalitions exert a statistically significant, negative 
effect on commitment intensity. Moreover, the interactive effect of these two content variables—
coalition type and ideological cohesion—further exerts diverse effects on the commitment 
intensity of coalitions. For example, Oktay (2014) suggests that minority coalitions can increase 
the intensity of their international commitments if their ideological composition leaves the 
opposition fragmented.  
 These studies echo the conclusion that coalitions are not a homogeneous category of 
cases (Clare, 2010; Kaarbo, 2012). Instead, their ideological and arithmetic composition yields 
different sets of institutional constraints and opportunities that influence their international 
behaviour. Beyond institutional explanations, other promising ‘content’ factors include 
‘institutionalised ideas’ (Ozkececi-Taner, 2005) and the specific area of foreign policy such as 
trade or European Union integration, which could influence government behaviour. One might 
also argue that ideological differences can be circumscribed when there is issue agreement, 
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suggesting a more flexible relationship between party ideology and foreign policy behaviour than 
what is suggested by the studies discussed above.  Such approaches might seek to include more 
contextually nuanced measures of ideological differences that include ‘ideational congruities’ 
that pervade particular political systems or even broader issue areas around which foreign policy 
expectations converge.  
  
PROCESS: TESTING THE THEORETICAL LINKAGES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR  
Different institutional structures, of course, are often associated with different processes of 
decision-making. Given the nature of the diffusion of power within coalition governments, 
several processes have been proposed that tap into the way in which parties interact with one 
another, or the ways in which parties perceive their constraints and opportunities due to public 
scrutiny and support. In particular, research has emphasised four different processes that may be 
driving coalition foreign policy. Hijacking and Logrolling are both intra-coalition dynamics that 
focus on the way in which power is utilised between coalition partners in an effort to achieve 
foreign policy objectives. Diversion and Diffusion of Accountability are both executive-
legislative dynamics that emphasise the power of public scrutiny, or ‘clarity of responsibility’ 
(Powell and Whitten, 1993) in shaping the foreign policy initiatives of coalitions. 
 Hijacking explanations pivot on the disproportionate ‘veto power’ (Tsebelis, 1995) of 
junior parties due to their capacity to bring down the government, as well as their ideological 
location in comparison with more moderate senior parties. Looking only at the veto potential of 
junior parties and leaving aside ideological composition, Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) find that the 
presence of such critical junior parties is associated with more cooperative, moderate, and less 
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committed behaviours which calls into question notions of ‘extremity’ associated with the 
‘Hijacking’ explanation. Both Clare (2010) and Oktay (2014) go further by combining veto-
players with ideological composition of the coalition, and Oktay further disaggregates ‘veto 
players’ by testing it across the three types of coalitions mentioned earlier. She argues that the 
veto players explanation finds support specifically when the surplus majority coalition grows 
ideologically loose (Oktay, 2014: 879).  
 Logrolling has been proposed as an alternative process to that of veto-player threats, and 
could explain more extremity or commitment intensity in coalition foreign policies. Here the 
logic is that fragmented coalitions may opt to ‘paper clip’ several different initiatives through a 
process of political reciprocity rather than confronting the challenge of brokering a political 
compromise. Unfortunately this decision-making dynamic has received little distinct empirical 
examination in the quantitative studies to date, as Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) do not provide a 
measure to distinguish it from veto-player explanations and it is not directly considered by either 
Clare (2010) or Oktay (2014). Given that logrolling turns on the highly fragmented nature of 
some coalitions, and given the apparent importance of coalition fragility (Oktay, 2014: 863; see 
also Auerswald, 1999: 477), this is perhaps an area deserving of additional empirical attention. 
 The ‘clarity of responsibility’ argument, which entails both ‘diversion’ and ‘diffusion’ 
explanations, seems to rest primarily on the ability of parties to effectively avoid blame for bad 
outcomes associated with riskier policies. This assumes a general risk aversion among political 
parties to begin with, such that when they can be directly held to account they are more likely to 
err on the side of caution. This has generally been examined empirically by measuring the 
number of parties within a coalition or by categorising the cases where the coalition is cushioned 
with extra parties against blackmail by a pivotal junior party (Oktay, 2014). The reasoning here 
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is that the larger the number of parties in a coalition, or where it includes more parties than 
necessary to maintain a majority, the lower the ability to assign blame to any one party by voters 
and thus the more risk-prone (committed, intense, extreme) the behaviours. Flipping this 
assumption, however, has the counter-intuitive effect of suggesting that coalitions may fail to 
gain credit for high profile initiatives, and thus we should expect them to be less risk-prone 
(committed, intense, extreme) than single parties. As a result, we have yet to conclusively show 
whether the clarity of responsibility mechanism constrains extremity or commitment in coalition 
foreign policy or provides opportunities for it.    
 Another factor that does not have a distinct decision-making explanation is the 
parliamentary strength of coalitions. While Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) find that weaker 
coalitions appear to be more extreme in their foreign policy behaviours than stronger coalitions 
(and the reverse holds for single party governments), it is not clear whether this is somehow 
related to veto-player threats, or perhaps a diversionary logic where there is excessive agreement 
driven by the need to divert attention from domestic weakness, or possibly some other process 
entirely. Clearly parliamentary strength plays a role in the stability and longevity of coalitions, 
but further research is needed to determine the way in which this factor influences foreign policy 
decision making dynamics..  
 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Throughout this review we have highlighted fairly specific ways in which research on 
coalition foreign policy might advance, but there is also room for some broader reflection on the 
direction of coalition foreign policy research. Indeed, if we are to generate a cogent and 
constructive research program, we suggest that coalition foreign policy scholars should work to 
16	
	
integrate findings across different methods in an effort to systematically build toward 
contextually sensitive process theories that help explain coalition decision-making, and that we 
should also further broaden our scope of investigation.  
 The preceding discussion has observed that the content of coalition governments and the 
processes with which they make policies suggests the importance of context in coalition foreign 
policy literature. While some of the existing quantitative studies offer methodological novelties 
to account for contextual variation (Oktay, 2014), we argue that coalition foreign policy should 
also exploit the advantages of multi-method approaches.  The existing large-N statistical 
analyses of coalitions have put forward some plausible theoretical explanations for their 
empirical findings, but case study research would more effectively isolate the underlying 
mechanisms involved, highlight important contextual factors, and could help to trace the process 
of decision-making (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Given the wealth of decision-making theories 
within FPA, this certainly seems to be an appropriate direction for further research. What is the 
best way forward, then, as we seek to coordinate research efforts spanning quantitative analysis 
and case study research?  Two approaches seem promising. 
 First, scholarship could attempt to examine in greater detail the mechanisms purportedly 
involved in shaping the decision-making dynamics within coalition governments by drawing 
random samples (or stratified random samples) of cases from the large datasets in order to more 
closely examine how policies were created and whether the presumed causal mechanisms were 
operating as predicted (Fearon and Laitin, 2015). The random sampling approach would 
maximise our confidence that the larger statistical effects are not built upon an ecological fallacy 
wherein attributes of the units are incorrectly inferred from characteristics observed in the 
aggregate.  While defining an appropriate universe of cases will undoubtedly pose some 
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challenges, such an undertaking would work to consolidate findings across methods and would 
facilitate theory development and more micro levels of analysis.  
 Second, researchers could explicitly design comparative case studies to leverage the 
various independent (coalition type, size, parliamentary support, etc.) and dependent variables of 
interest. While a number of scholars have explored individual cases of coalition dynamics (e.g. 
Ozkececi-Taner, 2005; Oktay-Karagul, 2014), several others (e.g. Hagan, 1993; Kaarbo, 1996a, 
1996b, 2012) have effectively utilised the comparative case study approach. As these works were 
striving to establish the importance of coalitions in shaping foreign policy, their case selection 
criteria tended to revolve around instances where coalitions did have a discernible and important 
effect (Hagan, 1993) or tried to compare more and less effective instances of junior party 
influence attempts (Kaarbo, 1996a, 1996b). These studies have helped to shape subsequent 
quantitative analyses, but the reverse could also be true. Drawing on the findings of quantitative 
studies, we suggest that future work might seek to compare coalitions involved in more 
commitment-intensive or extreme foreign policy behaviours with those engaged in more 
moderate rhetorical acts. If appropriate control/case selection variables are also drawn from 
existing empirical findings (number of parties, parliamentary support, etc.) we could begin to 
further trace the process of coalition dynamics in both a theoretically and empirically informed 
way.  
Beyond integrating methods with the goal of contextual nuance and decision process 
tracing, we should also consider further broadening the scope of coalition studies and drawing 
upon a wider range of foreign policy questions. We have already broadened our focus by having 
moved the dependent variable away from war and conflict, but this can also open the door for 
more extensive examinations of such things as strategic diplomacy. This would reverse the focus 
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on foreign policy emanating from coalitions and instead take coalitions as a potentially distinct 
target of other states’ foreign policies. Are there systematic differences in the ways governments 
deal with coalition governments? Do they explicitly attempt to exploit the divided domestic 
power inherent within coalitions? Along these lines, what are the prevailing domestic models of 
foreign coalitions? A particularly promising intersection, we think, would be an examination of 
coalitions from an image theory perspective, given image theory’s emphasis on perceptions of 
other governments’ decision making structure (Herrmann, 2013). While the impact of 
institutional structure on dyadic interactions has been dominated by studies focused on 
‘Democratic Peace’, we see real promise in approaches that seek to clarify how a target’s 
institutional configuration might factor into a state’s foreign policy strategy. Recently, Clare 
(2014) has demonstrated how democratic governments use their ideological composition to 
shape the international negotiation behaviour of their opponents. The path that the coalition 
foreign policy literature paves can push these inquiries toward the ‘two-level games’ (Putnam, 
1988) framework, where we can begin to investigate whether and how the negotiating actors 
factor in each other’s government structure to influence their win-sets. 
An even more ambitious approach might attempt to bridge the constructivist turn in 
Foreign Policy Analysis with the ‘soft positivism’ associated with much foreign policy 
scholarship (Houghton, 2007; Kubalkova, 2001).  This departs somewhat from the quantitative 
studies we have reviewed, but those findings can perhaps influence the types of questions that a 
constructivist approach might consider. For example, the degree to which a coalition is 
constrained–which itself seems to be a central issue for quantitative studies–may well relate to 
the way in which coalitions themselves are constructed within a given political context. The 
normative context and political meaning attached to the existence of a coalition is almost 
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certainly related to the ways in which it can exploit political will to enact policies. A new 
coalition in Germany or Israel, for example, will be construed differently than one in the United 
Kingdom or other political systems with little experience with coalitional governance. The co-
constitution of governed and government, then, will shape identity and construct the expectations 
about both representation and efficacy.     
 Finally, we envision a narrowing of the gap between Foreign Policy Analysis and 
Comparative Politics that concerns the quality of coalition policy-making. This puzzle has 
received significant attention in the Comparative Politics literature, where research has looked at 
the effect of multiparty governments on issues ranging from corruption levels (Tavits 2007), 
redistributive policies (Iversen and Soskice, 2006), healthcare spending (Huber, 1998) and labor 
law production (Tsebelis, 1999) to the order in which bills are introduced in the parliament 
(Martin, 2004). Whether similar hypotheses can be developed to test the quality of foreign 
policy-making in coalitions remains to be seen: do all coalitions spend more on defense—a likely 
outcome of logrolling dynamics—or do spending levels depend on the coalition's ideological 
composition? Are coalitions slow to respond to international crises relative to single-party 
governments, and if so, why? Moving forward, quantitative designs to study these questions 
among others will expand our understanding of coalitions and bring this research program closer 
to its counterparts in other subfields.  
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